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1.   Introduction 
The hierarchical structure of firms exhibits ample variation. Firms in heavy manufacturing 
industries typically have tall hierarchies (e.g., General Electric). Conversely, firms in the 
services industry, such as consulting firms, tend to be relatively flat and less hierarchical 
(e.g., Ernst & Young). What are the economic factors that influence the hierarchical structure 
of firms? How does the hierarchical structure respond to a change in these factors? How is 
production related to hierarchical structure? 
The neoclassical theory of the firm, as stated in Samuelson (1947), is silent in these 
respects. Narrowly defined, the neoclassical firm chooses inputs in order to maximize profit, 
taking prices and technology as given. Labour is usually treated as a homogeneous input, 
earning a uniform wage inside the firm. This treatment of labour is in great contrast with two 
stylized facts of firms: (1) firms have fewer workers at higher ranks; and (2) wages rise with 
the rank of workers within the hierarchy. These observations imply that firm production 
involves a hierarchical organization of workers, as well as a hierarchical scheme of wages. 
This paper incorporates hierarchical structure, in terms of production and wages, into 
the neoclassical theory of the firm. The extended framework inherits the key features of 
neoclassical firms whilst providing an analysis of the firm’s hierarchical structure and how 
this affects the production process. This has the advantage of retaining standard results from 
the neoclassical framework, whilst developing new insights regarding hierarchical structure, 
in a parsimonious model. Instead of taking the span of control and number of levels in the 
hierarchy as exogenous, we specify production directly in terms of these hierarchical 
attributes.  
A novelty of the paper is the use of a geometric approach to pose the optimization 
problem. More specifically, we model the shape of the hierarchy using a sector of a circle. 
This allows us to employ the geometric formulae related to the sector of a circle in the 
construction of the cost function, which keeps the analysis tractable. This geometric approach 
captures the essential features of the firm’s decision process, within a remarkably simple 
framework. The firm maximizes profit by choosing capital, the height of the hierarchy, and 
its width at each level. The height of the hierarchy is given by the radius of the sector. The 
width is encompassed by the angle of the sector, or ‘span of control’. 
The framework sheds new light on the question of the boundaries of the firm and firm 
size, originally posed by Coase (1937). By solving the firm’s hierarchical structure design 3
problem, we provide a new characterization of Coase’s original insight, namely, that the firm 
expands until the marginal benefit of doing so is no longer greater than the marginal cost. A 
striking feature is that this is obtained without any reference to transaction costs. We 
distinguish between vertical and horizontal expansion of the firm. In our framework, this 
corresponds to the decision on the firm’s height, and its width at each hierarchical level.
1
In considering the hierarchical structure of the firm, we come across the notion that 
different levels of the hierarchy command different wage rates. We incorporate this by 
introducing a wage schedule, which rises convexly with escalation along the hierarchy. This 
brings forth the question of wage inequality within the firm. The simplicity of the framework 
allows us to calculate Theil inequality indices (Theil, 1967) and to analyze how wage 
inequality relates to the structure of the firm. By choosing a plausible parameterization for the 
wage schedule, we obtain a measure of within firm wage inequality that approximates 
observed earnings inequality in the United States. 
1.1. Related Literature 
With prescient insight, Marshall (1898, Book IV, Ch. XIII and 1923, Book II, Chs. X-XII) 
noted the importance of hierarchical organization for the firm’s production process. More 
recently, Erich Gutenberg (1951) argues that firm productivity depends on the organization 
and complementarity of inputs rather than just the potential productivity of each input 
(Albach et al., 2000). Other authors
2 have also pointed out that the organization of workers, 
when combined with other factors, influences how successful a firm is in achieving its 
objective. The argument is that characteristics such as teamwork and the monitoring of 
workers are crucial to the workings of the firm (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).
Approaches to the hierarchical structure of the firm are diverse. One approach studies 
the ‘distribution of authority’ within the firm. This approach attempts to explain how workers 
are organized according to the influence one has over others (Shapley and Palamara, 2000; 
Rajan and Zingales, 2001; Hu and Shapley, 2003a, 2003b). 
Another approach focuses on the ‘shape’ of the firm, and provides insights on its 
structural design. The shape is determined by the number of levels in the hierarchy and by the 
span of control of superiors. The models in this branch range from theories of knowledge 
acquisition and communication flows (Garicano, 2000), information processing (Radner, 
                                                
1 One approach to the boundaries of the firm question is to consider firm scope (Teece, 1980) and vertical or 
lateral integration (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Alternatively, the problem can be viewed from the perspective of 
inputs, and the boundaries of the firm are then assessed in terms of its hierarchical structure (Wernerfelt, 1997). 
2 Reviews of the literature can be found in Holmström and Tirole (1988) and Garrouste and Saussier (2005). 4
1992), promotion tournaments (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Dubey and Haimanko, 2003), to 
loss-of-control along the hierarchy, possibly due to imperfect communication (Williamson, 
1967) or to imperfect observation and agency problems (Qian, 1994). 
Other approaches deal with issues of asset ownership and control (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 2005), as well as incentive (agency) problems (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Mookherjee and Reichelstein, 2001). In Yanes et al. (2005), we introduced a 
geometric approach to the firm’s hierarchical design problem, focusing on a specific 
example. The present study presents a more comprehensive treatment of that approach. 
1.2. Structure of the Paper 
In section 2, the firm’s general problem of hierarchical design is presented, and we show how 
previous studies have reduced the general case to specific but tractable problems. Section 3 
presents a model to solve a stylized version of the general problem. Section 4 offers an 
illustration using specific functional forms. Section 5 then provides comparative statics 
results for a particularly simple version of the model. Section 6 discusses wage inequality 
within the firm. Conclusions are offered in section 7. 
2.   The General Problem 
One can imagine a perfectly competitive firm that designs itself in order to maximise profit. 
Its design problem is to choose how much labour and non-labour input to use, as well as how 
to allocate its workers into different ‘positions’. Positions are defined by seniority and type of 
activity (e.g., accounting, marketing, maintenance, etc.), and each position is filled by one 
worker. In solving this problem, a perfectly competitive firm takes output and input prices, as 
well as technology, as given. In particular, the firm takes as given the market-determined 
wage profile for workers being hired in different positions. On the other hand, the firm 
determines the span of control of each worker, namely, how many supervisees he or she will 
be responsible for. This is a difficult problem to solve, which can be stated formally in the 
following manner. Let: 5
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The wage rate is typically rising with seniority. That is,  ah w  is decreasing in h and can be 
interpreted as a pay scale resulting from labour market conditions. The wage will also vary 
between activities, but for our purposes this does not need to be specified. The firm’s 
problem is specified as follows: 
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=− − ≤ ≥     (1) 
() ,, , F AH K   is the firm’s production technology. If F(.) is continuous and quasi-concave 
(strictly or otherwise), then existence of solutions to the firm’s problem is warranted. 
Moreover, if we impose strict quasi-concavity on F(.), or strict convexity on w(.), the solution 
is unique. The production technology encompasses the details of how workers interact, 
problems of monitoring, the efficiency of information and communication flows, and so 
forth. 
At this level of generality, the firm is free to choose any organizational form. We can 
imagine pyramidal firms, with a single top manager. In this case there would be exactly one 
worker at seniority level 1. Other structures are also possible. We can imagine a corporation 
which is managed by a board of trustees. In this case, we could have several positions at 
seniority level 1. Moreover, the organization need not necessarily expand (it may even 
contract) as we move onto lower levels of seniority, and we can imagine positions which do 
not have supervisory responsibilities, that is, they have no ‘off-spring’. Furthermore, the 
optimal organizational structure need not be symmetric
3. The resulting optimal structure will 
depend on how A, H and  affect output and costs, and the usual ‘marginal benefit equals 
marginal cost’ reasoning applies. 
                                                
3 This framework could also be used to analyse not-for-profit organizations, e.g., charities, or some religious and 
governmental organizations. In this case profit maximization could be replaced with other objectives, such as 
output maximization subject to non-negative profits. 6
Several attempts have been made at solving problems of this type. Each approach 
makes different simplifying assumptions in order to restore tractability. The closest papers to 
our work are those by Williamson (1967) and Qian (1994), so we shall show how their 
frameworks relate to the ‘general problem’ in (1). Both Qian and Williamson assume ‘no 
working foremen’, that is, the only workers producing physical output are workers at the 
bottom of the hierarchy. The contribution of higher level workers lies in inducing bottom 
level workers to produce more, through coordination, monitoring, etc. 
Williamson (1967) assumes that the span of control or the number of supervisees 
( ah θ ) is constant across the hierarchy, wages increase with seniority at a constant rate, and 
output is a Cobb-Douglas production function with the number of workers in each 
hierarchical layer acting as inputs. In our notation, Williamson’s production function can be 
written as  () ,
H1 A
ah h1 a1 Yc αθ
−
== = ∏  , where c is a constant converting input to output, and 
(,) 01 α ∈  is a constant measuring loss of control. In this formulation the top manager’s 
labour input is equal to unity, and bottom level workers do not have any supervisory duties. 
Control loss is justified by reference to imperfect communication of instructions between 
layers. With the exception of top management, control loss is present at all levels of the 
hierarchy, and reduces the productivity of inputs, namely, the number of workers in each 





=  (c.f., Williamson, 1967, p. 128). Williamson further assumes that non-labour 
costs are a constant fraction of output. In this model, the only choice variable is the number 
of layers in the hierarchy, which is chosen in order to maximize profit. The firm operates 
under decreasing returns to scale, which arise from the loss-of-control problem. 
Qian (1994) further elaborates Williamson’s approach by using optimal control 
techniques to endogenize, in addition to number of layers in the hierarchy, the span of 
control, loss of control and the shape of the wage schedule. Loss of control is now justified 
by reference to misaligned incentives, and the firm solves a principal-agent problem which 
results in workers receiving efficiency wages. Moreover, Qian allows for non-constant spans 
of control, effort levels, and rates of increase for wages in the hierarchy. Assuming a fixed 
capital-labour ratio, Qian specifies production as a recursive technology taking the 
form hh 1 h yy α − = , where  h1 y −  denotes intermediate output at hierarchical level h-1 and 
[] , h 01 α ∈  denotes workers’ effort at hierarchical level h. Workers’ ability to choose effort is 
the source of control loss. In our notation, final output can be written as follows: 7
() ,
AH
aH 1 h a1 h1 YC θα − == =  ∏ , where  ,
A
aH 1 a1 θ − =   is the number of bottom level workers –the 
only ones producing any physical output, C is a constant denoting potential output per bottom
level worker, and 
H
h h1 α
= ∏  denotes cumulative effort along the hierarchy. If one assumes that 
effort levels are constant and that span of control is constant across activities
4, then the 
production function simplifies to 
H1 YC A θα
− = , which is similar to Williamson’s. However, 
Qian assumes that the number of lowest level workers, Aθ , is a constant, whilst for 
Williamson this is determined by the span of control once the number of layers is chosen. 
Like Williamson, Qian finds that production occurs under decreasing returns to scale, again 
due to loss of control. 
This study takes a different route. We abstract from the internal details of the 
hierarchy such as loss-of-control or information flow problems by introducing a production 
function that does not depend on the interaction between hierarchical layers. Instead, we take 
the number of layers and the span of control as the relevant information about the 
organization of workers. Whence, these attributes are used as direct inputs in production, 
alongside capital. The two hierarchical structure inputs, like capital, feature diminishing 
marginal returns. In our formulation, problems such as loss-of-control and information flows 
(Radner, 1992) are captured by these diminishing marginal returns, and are not modelled 
explicitly. The span of control is an endogenous variable, and for simplicity, is assumed 
identical at each level of the hierarchy. Also, instead of considering the wage schedule as 
being determined inside the firm, we take this as given by the market. This seems plausible 
for the case of a perfectly competitive firm. To recap, our endogenous variables are: the 
number of layers in the hierarchy, the span of control, and capital. By endogenizing capital, 
we obtain interesting results for the capital-labour ratio. This feature further distinguishes the 
present paper from the work of Williamson (1967) and Qian (1994): Williamson assumes a 
fixed capital-output ratio, while Qian assumes a fixed capital-labour ratio. As we shall see in 
the next section, our approach will allow some convenient simplifications of the general 
problem. 
                                                
4 Note that Qian does not assume constant effort levels. On the contrary, in his general model, he finds 
decreasing effort and wages along the hierarchy. 8
3.   A Geometric Approach 
Consider a sector of a circle as an abstract representation of the hierarchical structure of a 
firm, as depicted in Figure 1. The height of the firm is represented by H, and can be 
interpreted as the number of levels in the hierarchy. The angle, θ, can be interpreted as span 
of control from any supervisor’s perspective. In the figure, h represents the distance from the 
highest position of the hierarchy. Thus h is inversely related to seniority, with h = 0
representing the top manager and h = H representing the lowest echelon of the hierarchy. b
represents the number of workers in a particular hierarchical level, h, and it can be interpreted 
as the width of the firm at that level. Using the arc length formula, we have b = hθ. 
Figure 1. Firm Hierarchy as a Sector of a Circle 
With this abstract representation, the problem of designing the hierarchical structure of the 
firm is reduced to choosing the height (H) and the angle (θ ) of the sector.
5 Similarly to 
Williamson (1967) and Qian (1994), our representation does not deal with the question of 
which activities are performed by which workers. As a result, the wage rate and output do not 
depend on activities. 
In posing the firm’s design problem as one of choosing the dimensions of a geometric 
sector, we make the assumption that the hierarchy features a continuum of workers, both 
horizontally and vertically. Thus, the area of the sector, given by 
2 /2 H θ , represents the 
firm’s workforce. The firm’s profit is specified as follows: 
(,)() ,
H
 0 PYb h w h d h r K πθ =− −   (2) 
                                                
5 More generally, one could allow the span of control to differ according to the hierarchical level. This would 
generate a more complicated geometrical structure, and the sides of the sector would no longer be straight but 
would bend outwards for increases in the span of control, or inwards for span of control reductions. 
b 
θ
  H  h 9
where  P is output price, Y is output, r is the rental rate of capital, K is capital input, 
(,) bh h θθ =  is the width of the hierarchy at level h, and  () wh is the wage schedule. The 
wage schedule is a differentiable, convex and decreasing function of h:  () 0 , () 0 hh h wh w h <> , 
where subscripts denote first and second derivatives, respectively. We assume that this wage 
schedule is set by the market. The firm is perfectly competitive, and consequently takes 
prices, including the wage schedule, as given.
6
Hierarchical structure is incorporated directly into the firm’s production function, 
allowing an inspection of the forces that affect hierarchical structure and production. The 
major departure of our model from the standard neoclassical model of the firm is that the 
labour input is measured in terms of H and θ, which enter the production function in the 
following manner: (, ,) YF H K θ = . Since costs are strictly convex, all that is required for 
existence and uniqueness of the solution to the firm’s profit maximization problem is that the 
production function be continuous and strictly quasiconcave (for existence, but not 
necessarily uniqueness, continuity and non-strict quasiconcavity are sufficient). In addition, it 
will be convenient to assume that F(.) is twice continuously differentiable (C
2), and features 
diminishing marginal returns. Diminishing marginal returns to H and θ  reflects the ‘loss-of-
control’ the top manager faces in the trade-off between height (distance to supervisees) and 
width (span of control) of the hierarchy (Qian, 1994). 
In the short run, capital is fixed and we introduce the following inequality 
constraint:K K ≤ . If we further assume that F(.) is increasing in its arguments, this constraint 
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  (3) 
If  F(.) is strictly quasiconcave and C
2, these yield unique solutions of the generic form 
*(, ) P K θ  and 
*(, ) H PK. The interpretation of (3) is straightforward; the left hand sides are 
                                                
6 An interesting extension would be to endogenize the construction of the wage schedule. Qian (1994) obtains a 
convex and decreasing schedule based on the notion of imperfect observability of subordinates’ effort. To 
ameliorate the agency problem, Qian introduces efficiency wages and obtains a wage schedule which decreases 
along the hierarchy. An alternative route would be to consider the demand and supply sides of the labour 
market, together with some notion of differentiation in the labour input (perhaps drawing on differences in 
human capital). This extension lies outside the scope of this study, and its consideration is deferred for future 
work. 10
the marginal benefits from a marginal change in  or H, respectively, and the right hand sides 
are the marginal costs. 
In the long run, capital is flexible and an additional first order condition needs to be 
considered: 
()
** ** ** ,, . K PFH K r θ =  (4) 
Replacing  K  with 
** K  in (3), equations (3)-(4) yield unique solutions of the following 
generic form
7: 
**(,) P r θ ,
**(,) H Pr, and 
**(,) K Pr. Note that these factor demands do not 
depend on wages. This is due to the fact that the wage schedule,  () wh, is determined once the 
height of the hierarchy, H, has been chosen. 
4.   An Illustrative Example 
In this section we assume a specific functional form for the production function,  (, ,) F HK θ : 
   ()
/
, YKH
βρ αρ ρ θ =+ (5)   
with ρ < 1, ρ ≠ 0, α, β > 0. This implies that output depends not only on capital and labour, 
but also on how the firm’s workforce is organized. Whereas the firm’s (unorganized) 
workforce is equal to the area of the sector, given by 
2 /2 H θ , its ‘effective’ (organized) 
labour is given by ()
/
H
βρ ρρ θ + . 
4.1. Returns to Scale 
If both θ and H change by factor 
1/3 s ,  s + ∈ , the firm’s workforce becomes 
2 /2 sH θ , while 
effective labour changes to 
/3 / () sH
βρ ρ β ρ θ + . Thus,  /3 β  measures returns to scale in the 
formation of effective labour, where: 
1:decreasing returns to scale
/3 = 1: constant returns to scale







To examine returns to scale in production of output, both the workforce and capital must 
change by the same proportion, s. This is achieved by multiplying H and θ  by 
1/3 s  and K by 
                                                
7 At this level of generality it is difficult to derive interesting comparative statics results, and in subsequent 
sections we shall make some simplifying assumptions to this end. The general results are available from the 
authors. 11
s, yielding a new output of 
/3 (, ,) s FH K
αβ θ
+ , where F(.) is as defined in (5). Thus, /3 α β +
measures returns to scale in production of output, where: 
1:decreasing returns to scale
/3 = 1: constant returns to scale






4.2. The Elasticity of Substitution and Intra-firm Specialization 
In (5), the elasticity of substitution between H and θ is given by 1/(1-ρ). If workers at 
different levels perform different tasks, then an increase in ρ indicates a decrease in the task 
specialization of workers within the firm. In other words, there is a decrease in intra-firm 
specialization. An indicator of intra-firm specialization is whether subordinates are able to fill 
their superior’s role in case of absence, and vice versa. For example, intra-firm specialization 
is expected to be higher in the manufacturing sector, relative to the fast food catering sector. 
In a fast food shop, a manager can easily take up the task of cooking in the absence of some 
workers. On the contrary, in a manufacturing factory, a manager may not be able to perform 
the task of a technician. In particular, as H and θ become more substitutable, the firm would 
be more inclined to give up one superior for another lower-level worker in order to reduce 
total labour cost. 
4.3. Wage Structure 
The wage schedule is determined by the market. It is uniform across each level and increases 
convexly as we move up the hierarchy. Total wage payments to workers at level h for a given 
θ are equal to  (,)() bh wh θ . Total wage payments for the firm are given by the integral of 
(,)() bh wh θ  from h = 0 (the top manager) to h = H (the lowest level worker). For tractability, 
the wage schedule is specified as follows: 
, W w
h
φ =  (8) 
where φ is (the absolute value of) the wage elasticity with respect to h, and W is a constant 
which can be interpreted as the economy wide average wage rate at hierarchical level h = 1. 
It is worth noting that since the tip of the hierarchy is normalized at h = 0, vertical expansion 12
of the firm will always be in the downward direction. To see this, note that the wage schedule 
is downward sloping in h, and cost per worker declines as the hierarchy expands vertically.
8
In the short run, capital is fixed atK , thus, we need to consider only the distribution 
and quantity of labour within the hierarchy. The firm’s problem is to choose H and θ in order 
to maximize profit. After substituting the functional forms specified in (5) and (8), the 























































To rule out complex values for θ
* and H
*, we assume φ < 2 in what follows. In the long run, 
capital is no longer fixed but is chosen by the firm. To obtain the long run solutions, 
** θ ,
** H , 
and 
** K ; substitute (5) and (8) into (3) and (4), taking care to replace K  with 
** K  in (3). The 
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We now proceed to make some simplifications in order to analyse these solutions. 
                                                
8 The perceptive reader may have noticed that this functional form for the wage schedule implies that the top 
manager receives a wage of infinity. However, this does not pose a problem: with a continuum of workers, the 
top manager’s measure is zero and hence the total wage bill remains finite. 13
5.   Comparative Statics and Further Simplifications 
In order to simplify the analysis of the comparative statics properties of the model, we set W
and φ to unity. This implies that the wage schedule, (8), is unit elastic. As will be shown later, 
the choice of φ = 1 approximates the value of φ that matches the wage inequality implied by 
the model with observed earnings inequality in the United States. These simplifications allow 
a concise analysis of how the firm’s hierarchical structure responds to parameter changes. In 
this simpler setting, the short run solutions in (9) and (10) simplify to 
1
2






 (14)     
Similarly, the long run solutions in (11) - (13) simplify to 
1
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As can be seen in (14) and (15), the simplification obtained by setting  1 φ =  introduces 
symmetry into the firm’s hierarchical structure. It is important to acknowledge the limitation 
that this imposes on the analysis, for such symmetry is unlikely to hold in reality. 
Furthermore, setting W1 =  simplifies the second order conditions considerably. The 
parsimony that these restrictions allow is such an attractive feature, that we decided to settle 
for simplicity. 
Lemma 1. If W = φ = 1, second-order conditions for profit-maximization in the short run 
require β < 2 and ρ < 0. In the long run, the requirements are α < 1, β < 2(1−α) and ρ < 0. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
The upper bound of β implied by the long run second order conditions, β < 2(1−α), implies 
that the firm operates under decreasing returns to scale. To see this, compare β < 2(1−α) with 
/3 αβ +  < 1 from (7), to obtain β + 3α < β + 2α + 1 < 3, which implies diseconomies of 
scale. This emerges because the wage is a decreasing function of h. Thus, the lowest rank 
workers are paid progressively less as the firm expands its hierarchy. If workers’ productivity 
did not fall at a sufficiently high rate as we move down the hierarchy, then a profit-14
maximizing firm would expand indefinitely along the vertical dimension. To see the intuition 
for restricting the substitutability between H and θ (ρ < 0), consider the case when H and θ
are perfectly substitutable ( 1 ρ → ). In this case, the firm can save labour costs by 
continuously expanding vertically and shrinking horizontally. In summary, β < 2(1−α) and   
ρ < 0 ensure a firm of finite size. 
The following propositions summarize the short run and long run comparative statics 
properties of the simplified model: 
Proposition 1. In the short run, the firm expands vertically and horizontally when output 
price rises. In the long run, the firm expands vertically and horizontally, and deploys more 
capital, when output price rises or the rental rate of capital falls. 
Proof: In the short run, let 












In the long run, let 












































          
As output price rises, marginal revenue rises and becomes greater than marginal cost. The 
firm takes advantage of this by expanding its hierarchy
9. In doing so, its marginal benefit 
decreases while its marginal cost increases until they equate again. The result suggests that, in 
industries in which output prices are protected (e.g., by regulation or trade barriers), firms 
would be ‘bigger’ in terms of the number of workers they hire. Since 2(1−α)−β < 2−β, 
changes in the hierarchical structure are greater in the long run than in the short run for a 
given change in P. This is a specific instance of the Le Chatelier-Samuelson principle 
(Samuelson, 1947). 
Note also that the output price elasticity of 
** K  is double that of 
** Z . Since the firm’s 
workforce is equal to 
2 /2 H θ  (area of the sector), the price elasticity of the firm’s workforce 
                                                
9 This result is also obtained by Williamson (1967) and Qian (1994), albeit using quite different frameworks. 15
is triple that of 
** Z . This means that if output price decreases, the firm’s labour force 
contracts more than its capital stock in percentage terms, leading to an increase in the firm’s 
capital-labour ratio. This is consistent with the observation that when firms face stronger 
price competition in a deregulated environment, they typically respond by trimming the 
workforce and streamlining production.
In the short run the capital stock is fixed, so changes in the rental cost of capital have 
no effect. However, in the long run, changes in the rental cost of capital affect the 
hierarchical structure of the firm as well as the capital stock. The long run effects of a rise in 
the rental cost of capital are of opposite sign to those of a rise in output price. 
Proposition 2. In the short run, the firm’s hierarchy contracts horizontally and vertically as 
intra-firm specialization decreases. In the long run, the firm’s hierarchy contracts 
horizontally and vertically, and uses less capital, as intra-firm specialization decreases. 
Proof: A decrease in intra-firm specialization is represented by an increase in substitutability 
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By Lemma 1, ρ is negative, hence an increase in ρ causes marginal revenue to decrease. 
Therefore, the optimal response for the firm is to contract its hierarchy in order to cut costs 
until marginal cost equates marginal revenue again. The result implies that firms would be 
smaller (in terms of their labour force) in industries for which division of labour happens to a 
lesser extent. This is consistent with the observation that a typical manufacturing firm is 
greater in size than a typical service firm. An extreme example of the latter is the case of 
tradespersons (‘one-man band’ firms), in which there is no division of labour, and the firm 
attains the minimum size. 16
As before, the long run response of the firm’s hierarchical structure is greater than its 
short run response. In the long run, a reduction in the firm’s workforce is accompanied by a 
reduction in capital. As with output price, the elasticity of the firm’s workforce with respect 
to ρ is 3/2 times that of capital. This means that as intra-firm specialization decreases, the 
firm’s workforce falls more than capital in percentage terms, leading to an increase in the 
firm’s capital-labour ratio. 
  
Proposition 3. Provided output price is sufficiently high, an increase in returns to scale in 
the formation of effective labour (that is, a rise in β) leads to an expansion of the hierarchy in 
both the short run and long run, and an expansion of capital in the long run. Otherwise, it 
leads to a contraction of the hierarchy in both the short and the long run, and a contraction 
of capital in the long run. 
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** ln K  are sufficiently positive), then 
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From Lemma 1, we have β < 2(1−α), which together with conditions (17) and (18) implies 
** /0 Z β ∂∂ >  and 
** /0 K β ∂∂ > . 
Conversely, if P is sufficiently low, it follows that 
* /0 Z β ∂∂ < , 
** /0 Z β ∂∂ <  and 
** /0 K β ∂∂ < .                    17
A rise in β can be interpreted as an improvement in the ‘organizational technology’ of the 
firm, that is, innovations in the way managers organize workers. Examples of this are 
changes in the organizational structure of the firm, such as those implied by multidivisional 
structure (M-form) versus the unitary structure (U-form). Maskin et al. (2000) explain how 
the unitary form exploits scale/scope economies to a larger extent than the multidivisional 
form. The results obtained in Proposition 3 imply that changes in returns to scale in the 
formation of effective labour may not have a uniform effect on all firms. Rather, this will 
depend on the firm’s environment. In a favourable environment with a high price for output, 
an organizational innovation leads to firm expansion. Conversely, in an adverse setting, such 
innovations lead to a contraction of the firm. 
6.   Wage Inequality within the Firm 
In this section, we compute wage inequality with the firm, and show that for certain values of 
φ, wage inequality will approximate the observed income inequality in the United States 
during the 1980’s. 
Income inequality is typically measured by the Gini coefficient, which involves pair 
wise comparisons between individual incomes. Since our hierarchical firm features a 
continuum of workers, pair wise comparisons are not meaningful. Instead, we measure 
inequality using the Theil indices, which are members of the entropy family (Theil, 1967). 
There are two Theil indices of inequality: Theil-L and Theil-T. In the discrete case, 
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To ensure that T and L are well defined, φ < 2 (which we assumed previously) is required. 
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. 
Hence wage inequality increases monotonically with the convexity of the wage schedule. The 
inequality indices, T and L, are independent of the specification of the production function, 
and only rely on the specification of the wage schedule. Thus, wage inequality as measured 
by Theil indices is not related to the hierarchical structure of labour, but to the hierarchical 
structure of wages. 
According to figures from the Bureau of Labour Statistics, U.S. Department of 
Labour, earning inequality as measured by Theil-T index was between 0.35 and 0.38 during 
the 1980 to 1988 period (Grubb and Wilson, 1992). For the Theil-T measure of within firm 
wage inequality to equal 0.38, the required value for φ is 1.07, which is reasonably close to 
the benchmark case of φ = 1 examined in section 4 (when φ = 1, T = 0.31). Moreover, wage 
inequality is usually smaller than income inequality, since income inequality includes 
investment earnings, which are likely to be more significant at the upper end of the income 
distribution. Although we do not claim that φ = 1 is the appropriate benchmark, the fact that it 
approximates observed inequality provides some support for the chosen value. 19
7.   Concluding Remarks 
This paper introduces a geometric approach to model the hierarchical structure of firms. This 
approach enables us to incorporate two stylized facts of firms into the neoclassical 
framework. The first stylized fact is that workers are organized hierarchically in firms, and 
the second is that wages also exhibit a hierarchical structure. Our framework uncovers some 
of the underlying forces that shape the firm’s hierarchical structure, whilst taking into account 
the distribution of wages within the firm. 
The geometric approach suggested in the paper differs significantly from other 
approaches in the literature on the hierarchical structure of firms. Its merit lies in its 
simplicity. With minor modifications on the standard neoclassical structure, the resulting 
model sheds light on possible causes of variation in hierarchical structure. 
By choosing specific functional forms for the production function and the wage 
schedule, we obtain explicit short run and long run solutions for the firm’s optimal choice of 
capital, hierarchical structure, and, as a result, labour. A simplified version of the model has 
enabled us to examine how the firm’s hierarchical structure changes with output price, intra-
firm specialization, and technology (Propositions 1-3). 
We have also shown that by choosing a plausible parameterization for the wage 
schedule, the simplified model can generate an estimate of within-firm wage inequality that 
approximates the observed earnings inequality in the United States. 
The present framework also provides new answers to the questions of the boundaries 
and size of the firm. The boundaries of the firm are now given by its height and width, and 
the size of the firm (in terms of its labour force) is now given by the firm’s geometric shape. 
The underlying forces behind these interpretations are of a similar spirit to Coase’s (1937) 
original analysis, since the firm’s actions are guided by marginal considerations. However, 
that is probably where any similarity ends, since the geometric approach itself is an entirely 
novel framework. Moreover, the boundaries, size and shape of the firm are obtained without 
any reference to transaction costs. Naturally, this is not to say that the latter are unimportant. 
Rather, our message is that standard neoclassical forces, in particular returns to scale and 
diminishing marginal returns, can be used to provide answers to the questions of the 
boundaries, size, and shape of the firm. Transaction costs would then be an additional force, 
the introduction of which serves to complement our analysis. 
In the general problem outlined in section 2, a position in a firm is defined by two 
attributes: the seniority of the position, and the activity performed in that position. This study, 
like Qian (1994) and Williamson (1967), has not considered how activities affect a firm’s 20
hierarchical structure. For instance, the top manager may prefer to keep strategic activities at 
arm’s length rather than delegating them to a ‘remote’ department. The role of activity in 
designing hierarchical structure of firm remains unexplored, and we have only but raised the 
question. The answers will have to wait for future research. 
We close the discussion with a conjecture. Given the closeness of our approach to the 
standard neoclassical paradigm, it should be possible to insert this model of the firm into a 
general equilibrium framework. This would bring forth an analysis of the interaction between 
economy-wide aspects, such as growth, trade and inequality on the one hand and the 
hierarchical structure of firms on the other. This could be particularly useful in providing an 
alternative approximation to the question posed by Qian (1994), on the differences between a 
centrally planned economy featuring a single hierarchy and its capitalist counterpart featuring 
a multitude of firms. This lies outside the scope of the present paper, and is deferred for 
future work. 
Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1: 








θ  to be profit maximizing, the Hessian matrix must be negative semidefinite. The 













where ‘*’ denotes values at the short-run optimum: H
* and θ
*, and subscripts denote second 
order partial derivatives. Sufficient conditions for negative semidefiniteness of 
   are as 
follows: 
** 0, 0 HH θθ ππ << and 
** * 2 () HH H θθ θ ππ π > . Noting that 
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(2 ) / 2
HH θθ βρ ππ == + −  and 
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(2 ) / 2
HH θθ βρ ππ == − − , the sufficient conditions simplify to β < 2 and ρ <0. 
In the long-run, the firm’s profit is  ( ) PKH Hr K
β
αρ ρ ρ πθ θ =+ − − . The associated Hessian 
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where ** denotes values at the long-run optimum: K
**, H
** and θ
 **. Sufficient conditions for 
negative semidefiniteness of 
  are: 
** 0 ii π < (i=K,H,θ), 
** ** ** 2 () HH H θθ θ ππ π > , 
** ** ** 2 () jj KK jK ππ π >
(for  j=H,θ  since
** **
HH θθ ππ =  and 
** **
HKK θ ππ = ), and  0 <
  , where  . denotes the 
determinant. After simplification, sufficient conditions reduce to the following restrictions: 
α< 1, β < 2(1−α) and ρ  <   0 .                  
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